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THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON TAX ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS: 






This paper analyses the impact of terrorism on tax enforcement effectiveness by focusing on the case of 
the Basque Country and Navarre. The reduced-form model shows that terrorism negatively affects tax 
enforcement set by the regional administration and, consequently, the way it is perceived by residents in 
this area. These results are tested by using Spanish surveys and other data sources, finding evidence of 
the negative impact of terrorism on tax enforcement as it is perceived by residents in the Basque Country 
and Navarre. In particular, this effect is stronger for entrepreneurs and liberal professionals. Instead, no 
significant impact for individuals resident in the rest of Spain is found. 
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Terrorism can impact aggregate economic outputs as well as specific sectors of activity representing more 
generally a cost for the economy of the affected countries (e.g., Enders & Olson, 2012). This negative 
economic impact is particularly relevant for countries or regions overwhelmed by terrorism (e.g., Abadie 
& Gardeazabal, 2003). Besides personal and material damage, terrorist activity induces a change in the 
risk perception of economic agents, impacting geographical mobility and population dynamics (Dreher, 
Krieger, & Meierrieks, 2011; Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002; Lozano-Gracia, Piras, Ibáñez, & Hewings, 2010; 
Sanso-Navarro, Sanz-Gracia, & Vera-Cabello, 2019) and leading to a permanent reduction in productive 
investments and consumption of goods (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008; Eckstein & Tsiddon, 2004). 
Additionally, the predatory financing system employed by terrorists may also impact the economy and its 
agents. In this light, one of the main forms of funding used by terrorist groups is that of extortion – the 
so-called ‘revolutionary tax’ paid by entrepreneurs and liberal professionals.1 As a result of its impact on 
economic activity and the behaviour of economic agents, terrorism may also influence the design of fiscal 
and monetary policies, either as any other unpredictable shock would or as part of the policy-makers’ 
endogenous reaction to terrorist activity. As the previous literature suggests (Gupta, Clements, 
Bhattacharya, & Chakravarti, 2004), terrorism can affect the fiscal accounts through three main potential 
channels: by disrupting real economic activity (gross domestic product – GDP); by distorting the 
composition of government spending; and by affecting the tax bases with negative consequences for tax 
revenues. While the evidence shows that terrorism has had little negative or no significant impact on GDP 
growth except in terrorism-plagued countries (see Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2019, for a survey) and 
demonstrates an increase in public spending to cover additional security needs (e.g., Hobjin, 2002; Gupta 
et al., 2004) with certain negative impact on the budget deficit (e.g., Eichenbaum & Fisher, 2004; 
Wildasin, 2002), very little has been said about the potential effects of terrorist activity on tax bases, tax 
collection and tax revenues. 
 
The present paper contributes to this literature by analysing the presence of externalities in tax collection 
due to terrorism. Specifically, the Basque Country and Navarre are used as a case study to test the impact 
of terrorism on the effectiveness of tax enforcement policies, broadly intended as the capacity or 
effectiveness in enforcing tax compliance. The Basque framework2 is particularly interesting to analyse 
                                                     
1 This is the practice of several terrorist organizations, including Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom – 
ETA) in the Basque Country (Buesa & Baumert, 2013; Leonisio, Molina, & Muro, 2017); the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) (Silke, 1998); and the National Liberation Front of Corsica (FCLN) (Sanchez, 2008). 
 
2 The Basque framework is referred to in a wider sense to include Spanish so-called foral autonomous communities of the 
Basque Country and Navarre. The foral community of the Basque Country comprises three provinces (Álava, Biscay and 
Gipuzkoa), while the foral community of Navarre coincides with the homonym province. For a more detailed description of 
the Basque framework and ETA terrorist organization, see Appendix A in the supplemental data online.  
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because terrorism has been a constant plague in this area. Furthermore, the provinces belonging to this 
territory have a high level of tax autonomy, while the remaining Spanish provinces are mainly 
administered by a central tax agency. Terrorism can distort the behaviour of the economic agents residing 
and operating there by inducing them to reduce their investment and consumption or to move their 
residence in order to avoid the costs of terrorism. In this light, De la Fuente (1999) and Sanso-Navarro et 
al. (2019) provide evidence that migration contributes to explain the negative demographic effects of 
terrorism in the Basque Country. Figure 1 shows the presence of a negative correlation between aggregate 
investment in the Basque Country and Navarre and the level of activity of the terrorist organization ETA 
in terms of killings per year. This provides casual evidence of the negative impact of terrorism on the 




Given the negative economic shock induced by terrorism and the correspondent threat posed by the 
geographical mobility of tax bases, the regional tax authorities of the Basque Country and Navarre might 
have an incentive to counteract these costs by strategically employing their tax autonomy and alleviating 
tax pressure so as not to lose their tax bases. Owing to the direct/indirect damages to their businesses 
caused by terrorist activity and to the pressure of terrorist extortion, entrepreneurs and liberal professionals 
constitute a cluster within the population that is especially exposed to these costs. Tax enforcement policy 
is a flexible, adaptable instrument for selective intervention, which can be used to compensate this specific 
cluster of the population for the costs incurred.3 In this regard, there is casual evidence that at least one 
Basque tax authority has exempted from fiscal inspections the tax returns of the entrepreneurs targeted by 
ETA.4 
 
The objective of this paper is to determine whether regional tax autonomy in the Basque Country and 
Navarre can be employed to adjust tax enforcement as to compensate the negative effect of terrorism on 
tax bases. To do so, a reduced-form theoretical model is developed and empirically tested by using a data 
                                                     
 
3 The previous literature on tax externalities has demonstrated that sub-central tax authorities may employ tax enforcement as 
an additional instrument for strategic interaction (Cremer & Gahvari, 2000; Durán-Cabré et al., 2015, 2016). 
 
4 An investigation conducted in 2004 by the Spanish anticorruption prosecution agency, reported by Buesa (2011) and by the 
national press (e.g., Korta, 2004; Bornstein, 2004), reported that the tax authority of the Basque province of Biscay formally 
exempted from being audited the tax returns of a group of entrepreneurs and liberal professionals who had treated payments to 
the terrorist organization as deductions in their tax forms. The consequent fiscal opacity might further distort the taxpayers’ 
incentives to resist extortion, particularly ‘if the payments to terrorists are mentally accounted for as an additional tax and, 




set based on survey results and other sources. The results of the theoretical analysis confirm the presence 
of externalities in tax enforcement due to the threat of the mobility of tax bases attributed to terrorism. 
The reaction function of tax enforcement to the costs of terrorism is derived and a negative sign is obtained 
that is also reflected in the way tax enforcement is perceived by residents in the region affected by 
terrorism. In order to corroborate this result, alternative measures of the costs produced by ETA's terrorist 
activity are employed and Spanish data based on surveys, in which respondents are asked to express their 
opinion about the authorities’ tax enforcement effort, are used. Certainly the effectiveness of a tax 
enforcement policy largely depends on the way it is perceived by taxpayers in the sense that what matters 
about taxpayers’ decision to evade is their perception of tax enforcement (e.g., Slemrod, 2007, 2019; 
Slemrod, Blumenthal, & Christian, 2001; and Kleven, Knudsen, Kreiner, Pedersen, & Saez, 2011 on the 
effect of differences in perceived audit rates on tax compliance). This perception is driven by two 
dimensions of the reality (Slemrod, 2019). Indeed, the tax administration can influence the reality as well 
as the perception of reality. On the one hand, it can increase the actual tax audit rate by, for example, 
hiring and training more auditors or more efficiently using the third-party information it routinely receives. 
On the other hand, it can also, for example, selectively disseminate information about its activities in order 
to increase taxpayers’ perceived tax audit probability and foster their tax compliance. In this sense, Blank 
and Levin (2010) show that the US tax authority has deliberately used tax enforcement publicity to 
influence individual taxpayers’ perceptions and knowledge about audit probability, tax penalties and the 
government's tax enforcement efficacy while taxpayers were preparing to file their annual individual tax 
returns. By estimating ordered response models, a significant and negative impact of terrorism on tax 
enforcement as perceived by individuals who reside in the Basque Country and Navarre is found. In 
particular, this impact is found to be stronger for entrepreneurs and liberal professionals, while no 
significant impact is found for individuals resident in the rest of Spain.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a summary of the relevant literature. The 
third section sets the theoretical framework. The fourth section presents the empirical strategy. The results 




The literature on the economics of terrorism is vast and can be usefully classified into different areas of 
study, including the analysis of the impact of terrorism on aggregate economic output and on specific 
sectors of activity as well as the effect of terrorism on economic policies. In particular, an increasing 
number of papers focuses on the economic output consequences of terrorist activity for individual 
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countries overwhelmed by terrorism (e.g., Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Dorsett, 2013; Eckstein & 
Tsiddon, 2004; Eldor & Melnick, 2004). The main conclusion of these articles is that terrorism represents 
a cost for the economies of the countries affected, and that terrorist activities do reduce economic growth, 
particularly if they are concentrated in specific regions (e.g., Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Dorsett, 2013; 
World Bank, 2002, 2003).5 That terrorism represents an economic cost is confirmed by the literature 
analysing the effect of terrorism on specific economic sectors (e.g., Llussa & Tavares, 2007a, 2007b). In 
this regard, several articles show that terrorist attacks may be considered as idiosyncratic shocks 
associated with noticeable decreases in consumption and investment (e.g., Eckstein & Tsiddon, 2004), as 
well as in capital flows and trade across borders (e.g., Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008; Bandyopadhyay, 
Sandler, & Younas, 2014; Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, & Younas, 2018; Nitsch & Schumacher, 2004), 
tourism (e.g., Buckley & Klemm, 1993; Drakos & Kutan, 2003; Enders & Sandler, 1991, 1996; Neumayer 
& Plümper, 2016), and airline demand (e.g., Ito & Lee, 2005). 
 
Yet, the possibility that terrorist activity might have fiscal and monetary consequences has received only 
limited attention in the literature, although, as Wildasin (2002) notes, terrorist ‘attacks are likely to trigger 
a complex series of simultaneous adjustments that reverberate throughout the entire system of private and 
public decision-making’ (p. 3; added emphasis). In this light, Gupta et al. (2004) analyse the fiscal effects 
of armed conflicts and terrorism on 20 low- and middle-income countries. These authors empirically 
corroborate that terrorism negatively affects GDP growth and changes the composition of government 
spending by increasing military expenditure in response to additional security needs, accompanied by a 
negative effect on social public expenditure (health and education) and on the level of the public deficit. 
On the revenue side, they show that the fiscal accounts are affected only in terms of a reduction in real 
economic activity, but they do not show any significant effect of terrorism on the government revenue-
to-GDP ratio.  
 
Further contributions to this literature are made by various papers that deal with the fiscal and economic 
policy consequences of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Hobjin (2002) estimates that the 
economic impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in terms of US security policies are relatively small (0.35% 
of GDP in 2003) and they are unlikely to have major effects on the fiscal discipline of the government or 
on productivity in the private sector. Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) and Wildasin (2002) argue that the 
large increase in military expenditures in the aftermath of 9/11 is not sufficient to justify the rise in the 
                                                     
5 Instead, cross-country and panel studies find mixed evidence for the macroeconomic effects of terrorism, showing that the 
average impact of terrorism on economic growth is either negative, but small in size (e.g., Blomberg et al., 2004; Tavares, 




government deficit and the large fall in labour and capital tax rates. Thus, these papers suggest that isolated 
terrorist events have a significant but limited effect on fiscal policies. Further research is needed in this 
field and, seen from this perspective, the analysis of the impact of terrorism on fiscal policies in the Basque 
Country is particularly appropriate. Since this particular case is characterized by persistent terrorist 
violence over a long period of time, the potential impact of terrorism on fiscal policies might extend 
beyond the simple spending reaction to an unexpected but isolated economic shock. 
 
Under the framework object of the analysis, tax authorities’ incentive to counteract the negative impact 
of terrorism on tax bases originates from the threat of mobility. In this sense there is evidence that 
terrorism has a negative impact on population dynamics and mobility. Indeed, by generating uncertainty, 
stress and risk, terrorism indirectly and negatively impacts the utility of economic agents provoking a 
change in their behaviour and inducing them to escape from it. Evidence of such dynamics is provided by 
Dreher et al. (2011). By employing data of 152 countries for the period 1976–2000, these authors show 
that terrorism affects the cost–benefit considerations of the highly educated individuals in ways that make 
emigration more attractive. Similar results are provided by Sanso-Navarro et al. (2019) for the Basque–
Navarrese context. In particular, their findings reflect the influence of migration on the negative 
demographic impact of the Basque conflict. 
 
Given the case under study here, it is useful to refer to the literature that analyses the economic impact of 
terrorism in the Basque Country from a range of other different perspectives. On the output side, the 
economic consequences of ETA's terrorism have been accurately analysed by Abadie and Gardeazabal 
(2003). On the one hand, they estimate the macroeconomic impact of terrorism in the Basque Country 
using a synthetic Spanish region with the characteristics of the Basque Country, but in the absence of 
terrorism. Based on this comparison, the authors find a 10% average gap between Basque per capita GDP 
and the per capita GDP of a comparable synthetic region without terrorism. On the other hand, they use 
ETA's 1998–99 truce as a natural experiment to estimate the impact of terrorism on the stock markets, 
and they find that the stocks of firms with a significant share of their business activity in the Basque 
Country showed a positive relative performance during the truce period, and a relative negative 
performance when the truce ended. Abadie and Gardeazabal’s (2003) results, together with Sanso-
Navarro et al.’s (2019) findings, suggest that terrorism may have further externality effects on tax bases 
and, consequently, on Basque fiscal policies. This paper aims at filling this gap in the literature. 
 
Buesa and Baumert (2013) describe ETA's financing system and its complex structural and economic 
network, but also illustrate the direct/indirect economic costs that ETA's terrorist activity has on the 
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Basque economy. Again, their study clearly indicates that when terrorism is persistent in the Basque 
Country and Navarre the negative economic impact is substantial. 
 
Finally, this paper shares some of the features of the literature on the economic policy impact of mafia-
type organized crime (in particular, Alexeev, Janeba, & Osborne, 2003, 2004). The theoretical framework 
presented in these papers is particularly appropriate for describing the context analysed here because of 
the similarities between mafia-type organizations and the terrorist organization ETA, particularly with 
regard to the extorting of regular payments from businessmen and firms, but more generally in that they 
represent a constant threat to the economic stability of the affected regions. This literature has emphasized 
the role of the mafia as an alternative tax collector and provider of public goods, such as protection and 
other services that facilitate a firm's underground activities, thus demonstrating the existence of 
externalities provoked by mafia on the tax collection process.  
 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Here the paper seeks to identify the possible externality in tax administration due to terrorist activity and 
raise the main hypothesis for the empirical analysis. A simple framework is developed consisting of a 
federal state comprising two representative regions (𝑖 = 1,2) of equal size in which the total population 
is normalized to one. Region 1 is subject to the permanent threat of terrorist activity, while the other one 
is not. Adhering to the most common approach in the literature (e.g., Shaw et al., 2009; Slemrod & 
Yitzhaki, 2002, 1987), the tax administrations are designed as revenue maximizing agencies that set the 
tax enforcement rate 𝛽𝑖 ∈ (0, 1) in their regions. Here the focus is on the potential externality effect of 
terrorism on tax enforcement policies, and so attention is restricted to one tax instrument, 𝛽𝑖, while 
assuming the tax rates in the two regions to be exogenously set6. Individuals face an income tax on an 
exogenously fixed and normalized-to-one tax base and decide the share 𝛼 ∈ (0, 1) of income to declare 
maximizing their utility. To ensure an interior solution, tax evasion is assumed to be costly for the 
individual. Since the effectiveness of a tax enforcement policy largely depends on the way it is perceived 
by taxpayers (e.g. Alm, 2000), it is assumed that the enforcement rate enters the individual’s objective 
function through their perceived probability of being audited 𝛽𝑖
𝑒(𝛽𝑖 , 𝑋 )
7. For sake of simplicity, the 
                                                     
6 Relaxing this assumption would not alter the results of the model, but it would add additional equilibria. Indeed, by being 
able to set two tax instruments, regions would compete in both instruments (Cremer & Gahvari, 2000; Durán-Cabré et al., 
2015) and theoretically may employ both of them in trying to compensate taxpayers for the cost of terrorism, although the use 
of statutory tax rates for this aim seems to be unlikely. 
 








2 > 0 and 𝑋 is a variable exogenously collecting information about the individual and situational 
characteristics as well as the social context that might have an impact on the individual’s perceived enforcement (e.g. Alm, 




individual’s problem is not explicitly developed here, and the results of the standard literature are assumed 
(e.g. Allingham & Sandmo 1972). The model consists of three stages:  
1. At the first stage, terrorist activity occurs in region 1 provoking an exogenous linear cost  𝐸 > 0 
borne by residents in this territory.  
2. At stage 2 the regional tax authorities set the regional tax enforcement rate 𝛽𝑖. 
3. At the third stage individuals choose their region of residence.  
The solution is provided by backward induction. 
Stage 3: The decision as to which region to reside in  
This section employs the notion of “home attachment” (see Mansoorian & Myers, 1993 and 1997) to 
model the problem at stage 3. At this stage, individuals compare their indirect utility function in the two 
regions in order to decide where they wish to reside. Assuming that 𝑛 ∈ (0, 1) indexes the individuals by 
measuring the non-pecuniary (psychic) benefit they derive from living in region 2 and that individuals are 





∗ + 𝑎 × (1 − 𝑛) − 𝐸       if 𝑛 lives in region 1
𝑈2
∗ + 𝑎 × 𝑛                           if 𝑛 lives in region 2




∗(1 − 𝛼∗(𝛽𝑖 ;  𝑡𝑖)) represents the (pecuniary) indirect utility function of an individual 
residing in region i = 1, 2;9, 𝑡𝑖 is the tax rate exogenously fixed in region i, and 𝑎 ∈ (0, + ∞) is a parameter 
representing the cost sustained by an individual when moving away from her home region. This means 
that the taxpayer’s utility from living in her own region increases with the cost of mobility. In this light 𝑎 
acts as a weight: if the costs of mobility are low (high), then the relative importance that the taxpayer 
assigns to the psychic part of the utility function, with respect to the pecuniary function, is low (high). In 
equilibrium, the marginal individual, that is, the one indifferent to residing in either region 1 or 2 is 
identified by 𝑛 = 𝑛1 such that: 
 
𝑈1
∗ + 𝑎 × (1 − 𝑛1) − 𝐸 = 𝑈2
∗ + 𝑎 × 𝑛1.                                                                                                            (2) 
                                                     
8 The psychic benefit from living in region 1 is then expressed as (1 − 𝑛). Thus individuals indexed by 𝑛 ∈ (0,
1
2
) reside in 
region 1 while those identified by 𝑛 ∈ (
1
2
, 1) reside in region 2. 
 
9 The direct utility function is defined as 𝑈 = [1 − 𝑡𝑖 × [𝛼 + (1 − 𝛼) × 𝜏 × 𝛽𝑖
𝑒(𝛽𝑖 , 𝑋 )] − 𝑔(1 − 𝛼)] where (𝜏 − 1) > 0 is   
the exogenous tax penalty per unit of tax evaded such that 𝜏 × 𝛽𝑖
𝑒(𝛽𝑖, 𝑋 ) < 1 and the function 𝑔(1 − 𝛼) represents the cost 




Since ∫ 𝑑𝑛 = 𝑛1
𝑛1
0
,  𝑛1 also represents the population resident in region 1 in equilibrium: 
 








.                                                                                            (3) 
 
The population in region 2 in the migration equilibrium is:  
 
𝑛2 = ∫ 𝑑𝑛 =
1
𝑛1
1 − 𝑛1                                                                                                                                                (4) 
 
Stage 2: regional administrations set tax audit policies  
At this stage, the regional tax authorities simultaneously set the tax enforcement rate by maximizing their 
objective function. As in previous studies (Cremer & Gahvari, 2000; Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, & 
Salvadori, 2015), it is possible to show that regions engage in a mobility-based competition and 
consequent race to the bottom in audit rates.10 However, unlike in these contributions, horizontal 
competition in tax enforcement is not fair in this model because of the presence of the externality produced 
by the terrorist organization in region 1 that reduces the tax authorities’ ability to set 𝛽1. The problem of 











) × [𝜃1 − 𝑑(𝛽1)], 
 
where 𝜃1 ≡ 𝑡1 × [𝛼 + (1 − 𝛼) × 𝜏 × 𝛽1] is defined as the effective tax rate in region 1, 𝑑(𝛽1) represents 
the tax administration cost such that 𝑑′(𝛽1) > 0, 𝑑(𝛽1)
′′ > 0 and  𝑟1 ≡
𝑅1
𝑛1
= [𝜃1 − 𝑑(𝛽1) ] is the unitary 








∗ − 𝐸 + 𝑎
× 𝑛1′𝛽1 × 𝑟1 > 0                                                                                                    (5) 
 
and 
                                                     
10 In particular, it is possible to show that 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are strategic complements. For a formal derivation, see Durán-Cabré et al. 










∗ + 𝐸 + 𝑎
× 𝑛1′𝛽2 × 𝑟2 > 0                                                                                                       (6) 
 
The left hand side of both equation (5) and equation (6) represents, for each region, the marginal benefit 
of increasing 𝛽𝑖, while the right hand side represents the corresponding marginal cost. In particular, since 
𝑛1′𝛽1 < 0 and 𝑛1′𝛽2 > 0, the marginal cost is positive in both cases. If we examine the denominator on 
the right hand side of both equations, it can be seen that the presence of costs related to terrorism (E), by 
affecting 𝑛1 and 𝑛2, increases the marginal cost of tax enforcement in region 1 while relaxing it in region 
2. Consequently, the optimal level of 𝛽1 (𝛽2) turns out to be lower (higher) than in the absence of terrorism. 
In other words, at this stage, given the exogenous level of 𝑎, 𝑡1 and 𝑡2, the tax administration of region 1 
has to compensate for the costs of terrorism by relaxing its enforcement of existing tax legislation. 
 
The equilibrium  
Multiple equilibria are possible and for simplicity 𝑡1 = 𝑡2 = 𝑡 is assumed. It is possible to show that in 
equilibrium 𝛽1 < 𝛽2 as long as 𝐸 > 0. Then, depending on the capacity of the tax authority in region 1 to 
maintain the individuals indifferent to living in either region 1 or 2, given the level of 𝐸, it is possible to 





<  𝑛2                          if  𝑈1
∗ < 𝑈2
∗ + 𝐸
 𝑛1 =  𝑛1 =
1
2
                          if  𝑈1
∗ = 𝑈2
∗ + 𝐸
.                                                                                                  (7) 
 
Applying the inverse function theorem to equation (5), the reaction function of  𝛽1 is derived with respect 




=   −
𝑛1𝐸 × 𝑟1𝛽1
𝑅1𝛽1𝛽1






(𝛽1, 𝐸; 𝑎, 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝛽2)
< 0                                                   (8) 
 
The first term of the numerator is the marginal loss of population in region 1 due to the costs of terrorism 
and it is negative; the term 𝑟1𝛽1is the marginal unitary tax revenue that is positive under the FOC. 
According to the second order condition of the administration’s problem, the denominator of equation 8 
is negative. The slope of the reaction function is then negative. Thus, equation 8 shows that the cost of 




The individual perceived enforcement 𝛽𝑖
𝑒(𝛽𝑖 , 𝑋 ) positively depends on the actual tax enforcement rate 






=   −
𝑛1𝐸 × 𝑟1𝛽1
𝑅1𝛽1𝛽1















< 0                    (9) 
 
The next section tests this result empirically. 
 
THE EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
The theoretical model developed in the previous section advances an interesting result that requires 
empirical investigation. Terrorism operates as a negative externality on tax administration by constraining 
the tax authority’s ability to enforce existing tax legislation in the region affected by terrorism . Because 
of individual mobility and thanks to tax autonomy, the tax authority reacts to the higher costs of terrorism 
being borne by taxpayers by reducing the level of tax enforcement so as not to lose tax bases (equation 
8). The perceived tax enforcement is a function of the information that individuals have on the actual 
enforcement policy. More precisely, individuals’ perception of tax enforcement positively depends on the 
actual tax enforcement. Thus, by impacting the actual policy, terrorism also affects tax enforcement as it 
is perceived by individuals, this being lower the higher the costs related to terrorism (equation (9)).With 
the aim of testing these theoretical predictions, tax enforcement as it is perceived by individuals in Spain 
is employed here as a dependent variable. This section also describes the empirical strategy employed to 
identify the changes in this variable that are due to the externality produced by terrorism in the setting of 
the actual policy. In particular, the aim is to isolate this effect from those changes determined by other 
structural factors that may alter the real tax enforcement or the individual component of the perceived 
enforcement. Indeed, the perceived tax enforcement might also vary due to the variation of individual 
personal characteristics. Thus, in the absence of data on tax enforcement policies performed by tax 
authorities at the regional level, individual perceptions of tax enforcement, once filtered by potential 
confounders, can play the right role as a measure of tax enforcement effectiveness. In this light, as 
suggested in the introduction, the perceived tax enforcement can be used as a direct proxy for the 
effectiveness of the actual policy, since what matters about the decision to evade is taxpayers’ perception 
of the tax audit probability. If taxpayers’ perceived probability of detection increases, the tax authority’s 
capacity or effectiveness to enforce tax compliance is boosted. Therefore, taxpayers’ mobility also 
depends on the way they perceive tax policies, including tax enforcement. In order to perform the analysis, 
11 
 
a data set based on the information provided by surveys and data from different Spanish sources is 
constructed. Specifically, data from the 1994–2015 waves of the survey ‘Public Opinion and Fiscal 
Policy”11, conducted annually and released by the Spanish Centre of Sociological Research (Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociológicas – CIS), are used. This repeated cross-section survey reports information on 
subjective perceptions of the fiscal policies, public provided goods and services, and other aspects of the 
tax system in Spain. Socioeconomic information about the respondents and their province of residence is 
also included in the survey data. In order to define the dependent variable, the following question is 
employed: “Do you think that the tax administration is currently taking many/quite a few/a few/very few 
steps in its efforts to fight tax evasion?”12, which remains unchanged over the period 1994-2015. For any 
respondent i in province j in survey year t, the answer to this question is coded into the variable 𝛽𝑒
𝑖𝑗𝑡
 
which is scaled from very low (1) to very high (4) according to the answer. Thus, by defining 𝛽𝑒
𝑖𝑗𝑡
 as an 
ordinal dependent variable measuring the latent actual perceived tax enforcement of individuals (𝛽𝑒∗
𝑖𝑗𝑡
), 














1            if    𝛽𝑒∗
𝑖𝑗𝑡
≤ 𝜔1                             
2            if   𝜔1 < 𝛽
𝑒∗
𝑖𝑗𝑡
≤ 𝜔2                   
3            if   𝜔2 < 𝛽
𝑒∗
𝑖𝑗𝑡
≤ 𝜔3                  
4            if    𝛽𝑒∗
𝑖𝑗𝑡
> 𝜔3                             
                                                                                          (10) 
 
The coefficients as well as the cut-points in equation (10) are estimated through an ordered probit model 
by means of maximum likelihood techniques. In order to measure the costs generated by ETA’s terrorist 
activity, an approach is employed that is standard in the literature (e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003), 
and is based on the use of information about ETA’s truces and ceasefires13. A dummy variable equal to 1 
                                                     
11 All annually released surveys are based on personal interviews conducted with a representative sample of 2500 Spaniards 
over the age of 18. The complete contents of the survey are available at the CIS website (http://www.cis.es). 
 
12 The original question in Spanish is “¿Cree Ud. que, en la actualidad. la Administración hace muchos, bastantes, pocos o muy 
pocos esfuerzos para luchar contra el fraude fiscal?” (e.g. question n. 21 of the survey n. 2994 released in 2013, as the 
numbering of the questions might change from year to year). 
 
13 Apart from 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡, three alternative direct proxies of ETA's terrorist activity have been employed: the number of fatalities 
attributed to ETA in any Spanish province/year; the total pecuniary compensation for the damage caused by terrorism provided 
by the Spanish Ministry of the Interior; and an estimation of the total revenues obtained by ETA through the ‘revolutionary 
tax’ in the foral provinces. 
12 
 
is constructed for the years in which a truce was announced and implemented by ETA. Specifically, 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡 is defined as being equal to one if a ceasefire were announced and implemented by ETA in 
province j during the survey year t, that is, during a period of time within the 12 months previous to the 
implementation of the survey14. This variable indirectly measures the costs of ETA’s activity in terms of 
the threat to personal security and provincial stability and the coefficient 𝜇 measures its impact on the 
perceived tax enforcement. 
According to the theoretical model, terrorism should negatively impact tax enforcement and its perception 
in the areas most affected by terrorist activity in Spain, namely, the four provinces belonging to the foral 
autonomous communities of the Basque Country and Navarre. Thus, an interaction term between 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡 and 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 –  a dummy variable equal to 1 for residents in the foral provinces – is employed 
and the correspondent coefficient 𝜋 is expected to be positive.15 This term picks up the differential effect 
of terrorism on perceived tax enforcement in the foral communities with respect to common regime 
provinces. Similarly, the overall impact of terrorism on perceived tax enforcement in foral provinces is 
also expected to be positive. This effect is represented by the linear combination between the interacted 
and the un-interacted terms that is the derivative of the latent perceived tax enforcement with respect to 
the variable 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡 if  𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡is equal to 1 (i.e. the estimated sum of coefficients 𝜇 +  𝜋). In order to 
control for the residual effect of being resident in a province belonging to the foral financing system on 
the perceived tax enforcement, the variable  𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 not interacted is also included. 
 
According to the assumption of the theoretical model, the perceived tax enforcement is a function of the 
information that individuals have on the actual enforcement policy. In particular, actual tax enforcement 
and the individuals’ perception of it are expected to be positively related. In order to disentangle the 
changes in perceived tax enforcement due to the externality produced by terrorism in the setting of the 
actual tax enforcement from those changes determined by other structural factors that may alter the 
real tax enforcement, included in vector 𝑿𝒋𝒕 is information on contextual variables that directly affect the 
setting of the enforcement policy and provincial fixed effects (𝜗𝑗) are employed. In this way, one is 
                                                     
 
14 An announced truce is considered as being implemented by ETA in a specific province/year if during that period ETA did 
not claimed fatalities in that province. The possibility to let this variable vary not only over time but also across provinces is 
of particular interest for the analysis since in the territories belonging to the foral regime the tax authorities are appointed to 
operate at this level of government. Information on truces and on fatalities is extracted from the data set of the Spanish Ministry 
of the Interior. 
 
15 Since the variable 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡 is indirectly related to the level of terrorist activity, according to equation (9), its coefficient is 




implicitly controlling for the structural component of the actual policy. Specifically, vector 𝑿𝒋𝒕 controls 
for per-capita provincial GDP, provincial population, and also includes dummies for rightist central 
government, country electoral cycle, leftist regional government, regional electoral cycle.  
 
In the theoretical model, it has also been assumed that the perceived tax enforcement is a function of 
individual personal characteristics. In order to account for the individual component of perceived 
enforcement, the vector of variables 𝒀𝒊𝒋𝒕 collects information on relevant personal and social 
characteristics that are likely to influence the individual’s perception of the risk of being audited. These 
variables are also extracted from the survey “Public Opinion and Fiscal Policy”. Specifically, the vector 
includes controls for sex, age, level of education, civil status, job market status (including a dummy for 
employed people, a dummy for retired people and a dummy for employees employed in the public sector) 
as well as respondents’ political views (including dummies for leftist voter, nationalist voter and a set of 
dummies for the political parties that respondents declared to vote for). The vector also includes a dummy 
for the main contributors to households’ income (heads of household), a dummy identifying entrepreneurs 
or liberal professionals with employees (self-employed), and a control for the size of the municipality of 
residence of the respondents. Finally, common time effects (𝜏𝑡) are included to account for common time 
trends, such as the aggregated component of the economic cycle at the national level, while 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the 
error term.  
 
As emphasized in the introduction, Basque and Navarrese entrepreneurs and professionals constitute the 
cluster of individuals that are most affected by the costs of terrorism, as a result of their exposure to 
blackmailing and due to the potential direct and indirect costs to their businesses. This makes these self-
employed workers a specific target for potential tax enforcement cutbacks by the foral tax authorities. 
Therefore, it is suspected that that terrorism may have a stronger impact on the perceived tax enforcement 
of self-employed workers resident in the Basque Country and Navarre. For this reason, equation (10) is 




















1            if    𝛽𝑒∗
𝑗𝑖𝑡
≤ 𝑤1                             
2            if   𝑤1 < 𝛽
𝑒∗
𝑗𝑖𝑡
≤ 𝑤2                   
3            if   𝑤2 < 𝛽
𝑒∗
𝑗𝑖𝑡
≤ 𝑤3                  
4            if    𝛽𝑒∗
𝑗𝑖𝑡
> 𝑤3                             




Analogous with what is explained above, the coefficient 𝜂 is estimating the differential effect of terrorism 
on perceived enforcement of self-employed people resident in a foral province and the correspondent 
overall effect is given by the estimated sum of coefficients 𝛾 + 𝜉 +  𝜂. It is expected that both are positive 
and significant. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the magnitude of the coefficients and as a 
robustness analysis, one also collapses the dependent variable in equations (10) and (11) into a binary 
variable taking value 1 if the individual declares a relatively high perceived tax enforcement (𝛽𝑒
𝑗𝑖𝑡
∈
{3,4}) and 0 otherwise and the coefficients are estimated through a probit model.  
 
With the exception of the dependent variable, the indirect proxy of the costs of terrorism (𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡) and of 
the individual personal characteristics discussed above, the other variables are obtained from the following 
statistical sources. The provincial per-capita GDP and the provincial population are provided by the 
Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE). The dummies identifying rightist government in office and 
elections are based on information extracted from the electoral database of the Spanish Ministry of the 






Table 2 reports the results of the model expressed in equation (10). More precisely, column 4 presents the 
results obtained estimating equation (10) by means of an ordered probit model including all the control 
variables. Columns 1 to 3 estimate more parsimonious ordered probit models where just some of the 
explanatory variables are included. Table’s 2 structure is coherent with the filtering process presented in 
the estimation strategy. Specifically, column 1 reports by way of a baseline estimation a model without 
including personal characteristics of the respondent (𝒀𝒊𝒋𝒕) and contextual variables (𝑿𝒋𝒕), columns 2 and 
3 include alternatively 𝒀𝒊𝒋𝒕 and 𝑿𝒋𝒕 as control variables. Fixed effects at provincial level and time effects 
are included in any specification. The different number of observations is due to coverage of the CIS 
surveys for the relevant questions; all the available observations are used in every regression. Using the 
interpretation given for the latent variable, it is possible to interpret the estimated coefficients in terms of 
the marginal effects of the regressors on the latent perceived tax enforcement 𝛽𝑒∗
𝑗𝑖𝑡
16. Finally, the 
                                                     
16 The coefficients can always be interpreted as the marginal effects of the regressors on the latent variable, which is particularly 
useful in contexts such as that analysed here, where the latent variable can be given some easily interpretable meaning and it 




coefficients collected in column 5 represent the results of the probit model obtained redefining the 
endogenous variable in a dichotomous way. 
 
In all models, the indirect proxy for the cost of terrorism (𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡) significantly impacts the individuals’ 
perceived tax enforcement in a way that is consistent with the theory. In particular, this variable has a 
significant impact on the perceived tax enforcement of individuals residing in the foral provinces – the 
interacted terms 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 and the corresponding linear combination with 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡 are 
significant and positive in all the specifications – but it does not have any effect on the tax enforcement 
perceived by the rest of the individuals interviewed (the un-interacted terms 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡 are not significantly 
different from zero). In other words, the tax enforcement as it is perceived by individuals residing in the 
foral provinces  is significantly higher during periods of terrorist inactivity, while there are not significant 
differences in the perceived tax enforcement of individuals residing in the rest of Spain. Thus, this result 
suggests that while terrorism represents an externality in the tax-enforcement-setting process for the foral 
tax authorities, it does not impact at all on the setting of auditing policies in the provinces belonging to 
the common tax regime, which are administered by a central agency.  
 
As for the other variables, it is found that the dummy variable 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 is negative and significant. This 
result may well be evidence of the competitive behaviour of the foral provinces or more generally it might 
record a generally lower level of enforcement in the foral communities. The entrepreneurs and liberal 
professionals (dummy 𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡) are found to report a higher perceived tax enforcement than that reported by 
the rest of the population, which makes sense because their probability of being audited is higher as they 
have more opportunities to evade taxes. Concerning the other survey control variables, it is possible to 
observe that the perceived tax enforcement tends to be lower in bigger municipalities while it increases 
with the age of the interviewed person. The coefficients of left-wing voters and females are negative which 
might entail a demand for stricter enforcement of the existing tax rules by these clusters. The coefficient 
of the per-capita provincial GDP is negative. This result suggests that tax enforcement effectiveness tends 
to present on average a counter-cyclical trend17. Finally, the perceived tax enforcement is increasing in 
the size of provincial population and it tends to be higher in presence of rightist central governments and 
during electoral years. 
 
 
                                                     
17 The issue of potential cyclicality of tax enforcement is theoretically analysed by Andreoni (1992) and empirically tested by 
Durán-Cabré et al. (2018). Their results confirm this prevailing counter-cyclical trend for Spain, but suggest that in the presence 






Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of equation (11). Its structure replicates that of Table 2. The 
impact of ETA’s terrorist activity on the perceived tax enforcement of the residents in the foral provinces 
is even stronger for the cluster of entrepreneurs and liberal professionals, as the interacted terms and linear 
combinations of interacted and un-interacted coefficients show. Finally, both Table 1 and 2 include several 
indexes of goodness to fit (i.e. the log-likelihood; the McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2; the R2Count measuring 
the proportion of correct predictions; the Akaike's information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian 
information criterion (BIC)) in order to guide model selection. These tend to indicate that the full ordered 
response model estimating equation (11) (column 4, Table 3) outperforms the other ordered response 
models and thus this is considered the final model18. 
 
Thus, the results of the analysis performed here show that in the presence of more intense terrorist activity, 
individuals residing in the foral territories perceive a lower level of tax enforcement. This confirms that 
the costs of terrorism do represent a negative externality for the foral communities. In particular, the 
impact of the cost of terrorism is significantly stronger for self-employed people confirming that the foral 
tax authorities might find it convenient to react to the externalities attributable to terrorism by reducing 
tax enforcement in particular for this group of people. 
 
 [TABLE 3] 
 
As a robustness check, a multilevel version of both the complete ordered probit and probit models is also 
performed (e.g. De Leeiw and Meijier, 2008; Goldstein, 2011 and Hedeker, 2008), which confirms and 
reinforces the results of the main analysis. These results are reported in Appendix B. As a further 
robustness check, ordered logit and logit models are also estimated, obtaining results congruent with the 
main analysis.19 A final robustness check consists of a placebo test that furthers the analysis on the 
provinces of Madrid and Barcelona. These have also been frequent targets of ETA’s attacks, but terrorism 
is not expected to operate as a negative externality on tax enforcement there. This is confirmed by the 
analysis presented in detail in Appendix C in the supplemental data online. Indeed, the placebo test 
                                                     
18 Probit models tend to outperform ordered response models, but since these models are based on a way the dependent variable 
was recoded into a binary one, they cannot be directly compared with the ordered probit models, and this is considered as a 
robustness check. 
 
19 These results are available from the author upon request. 
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corroborates the main hypothesis of the paper that the reaction on the part of the tax administration is a 
result of the combination of tax autonomy and permanent threat of terrorism. 
 
FURTHER RESULTS: ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF THE COST OF TERRORISM 
This section performs an additional robustness analysis by employing three different direct measures of 
the costs of terrorism alternative to the indirect proxy 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡.
20 Specifically, it employs as a measure of 
the aggregate costs of terrorism the pecuniary compensation for the damages caused by ETA provided by 
the Spanish Ministry of the Interior21 on a national and annual basis.22 This variable is defined at the 
national level, as it is a proxy of the ETA terrorist costs for the affected economy. Alternatively, the 
section employs a variable collecting information on the number of fatalities attributed to ETA in any 
Spanish province/year and, thus, directly identifies the costs generated by ETA in terms of the threat to 
personal security and provincial stability.23 Finally, it employs an estimate of the total revenues obtained 
by ETA through the extortion of the ‘revolutionary tax’ in the foral provinces. This estimate is obtained 
by Buesa and Baumert (2013) employing documents seized from ETA by the Spanish anticorruption 
prosecution agency and, therefore, it is likely to be downward biased and measured with error. This 
variable is set as being equal to zero for the rest of the country and, consequently, no interaction term is 
calculated. Since all these variables directly measure the cost of terrorism, a significant negative 
coefficient for the interacted terms and linear combinations of interacted and uninteracted terms are 
expected.  
 
Table 4 presents the results of the estimation of equation (10) employing these alternative direct proxies 
of the costs of terrorism. Each model includes individual characteristics, contextual-level characteristics, 
provincial fixed effects and time effects. Column 1 replicates the results presented in column 4 of Table 
2 employing the variable 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡; the other models substitute this variable by one of the above-mentioned 
direct measures of the costs of terrorism. The results of these models are qualitatively equivalent to those 
                                                     
20 See footnote 13. 
 
21 Compensations include personal as well as material damages. These data are extracted from the statistical report annually 
released by the Spanish Ministry of the Interior (for the 2013 report, see http://goo.gl/GEwg2R). 
 
22 These data are aggregated at the national level and do not distinguish between the compensation paid out to the victims of 
ETA from that paid out to the victims of other terrorist organizations. Nevertheless, the author excluded data referring to the 
2004 Al-Qaeda terrorist attack, and as 96.5% of the fatalities/injuries of terrorism in Spain are attributable to ETA, it seems 
these measures provide a reasonable approximation of the damage caused by ETA's activity. 
 
23 This frequently used indicator has been criticized since it tends to underestimate the degree of terrorist activity (Frey, 
Luechinger, & Stutzer, 2007). As for 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡, this variable is defined by considering the survey year, and it is extracted from 




obtained when employing 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡 as the interacted terms and linear combinations of interacted and 




Finally, Table 5 reports the results of the estimation of equation (11) employing these alternative variables. 
The structure replicates that used in Table 4 and includes the additional interactions with the dummy for 
self-employed. The main result still holds for any specification while, in this case, the impact of terrorism 







This paper has analysed within an asymmetric federal framework the impact of externalities due to 
terrorism on tax enforcement effectiveness measured in terms of perceived tax enforcement. According 
to the reduced-form model, by acting as a negative shock to the economy and thus altering individuals’ 
incentives to reside in their home region, terrorism constrains the tax authority’s ability to set tax 
enforcement policies in the affected region. The lower regional effectiveness in enforcing tax compliance 
is reflected in lower taxpayers’ perceived tax enforcement. This hypothesis has been tested for the Basque 
Country and Navarre within the Spanish framework. By employing surveys as well as data extracted from 
other statistical sources, ordered response models whose outcomes corroborate the theory have been 
estimated.  
 
The results of the empirical analysis show that terrorism negatively and significantly impacts the 
perceived tax enforcement of individuals residing in the Basque and Navarrese provinces, with a more 
marked effect on self-employed workers. No significant effect is reported for the residents in Spanish 
common-regime provinces, where the main taxes are administered by the central government. Thus, 
terrorism acts as a negative externality on the effectiveness in enforcing tax compliance only in the 
provinces where it represents a substantial and persistent cost that may significantly affect the residents’ 




Conceptually, terrorism might represent an additional cost in terms of revenue losses for the Basque and 
Navarrese provinces if taxpayers’ threat to move materializes in a significant way. Abadie and 
Gardeazabal’s (2003) results are implicitly calculated net of this effect, and so they could be considered 
as a lower bound of the impact of terrorism on the Basque economy. Nevertheless, as a result of tax 
autonomy, the tax administrations in foral provinces may strategically use tax enforcement as an 
instrument to mitigate the mobility of tax bases and counteract the negative effect of terrorism on tax 
revenues and definitely on the economy. Certainly, this is not costless because a reduced capacity to 
uncover evasion in periods of more intense terrorist activity has also a negative impact on tax revenues, 
but this is likely to be significantly lower than the counterfactual revenue losses due to higher mobility of 
tax bases. The stable presence of the Basque Country and Navarre among the richest regions in Spain 
seems to be a casual (coarse) evidence of this. Furthermore, according to the results of the analysis, the 
tax authorities may well have compensated this negative enforcement revenue effect by setting higher tax 
enforcement during periods of relative inactivity of ETA. All in all, the paper confirms the evidence 
presented in related literature that tax enforcement (Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, & Salvadori, 2018) and 
in particular tax autonomy in enforcement policies (e.g., Durán-Cabré et al., 2015, 2016) provide an 
additional instrument to tax authorities that may be employed for strategic interaction or to counteract 
negative shocks to the economy. Given that ETA announced its definitive dissolution in 2018, future 
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Figure 1: Relationship between investments and terrorist activity in the Basque Country and Navarre (1964-
2012) 
 
      
Source: Author’s own calculations from the IVIE and BBVA Foundation stock capital database (available at http://goo.gl/fbmGmG) and 




Table 1: Summary Statistics 
  
Variable Measurement Unit Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Key variables      
Perceived Tax Enforcement Ranking 1 to 4 47497 2.35 0.81 1 4 
Truce Dummy 54558 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Individual Characteristics       
Female Dummy 54558 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Age Years 54547 46.33 18.14 18 99 
Civil Status (married) Dummy 
 
54514 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Household head Dummy 54558 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Worker Dummy 54558 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Retired Dummy 54532 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Public Employee Dummy 54558 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Self_Employed Dummy 54558 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Foral Dummy 54558 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Municipality size Ranking 54558 3.24 2.14 0 7 
Nationalist Dummy 54558 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Left Dummy 54558 0.02 0.12 0 1 
Social context characteristics       
Rigthist Central Government Dummy 54558 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Per_Capita_GDP Euros per capita 54558 21824.99 6410.42 9314.08 60220.40 
Population Thousands of People 54558 2094.38 2011.32 90.70 6461.97 
Country Electoral Cycle Dummy 54558 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Leftist Regional Government Dummy 54558 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Regional Electoral Cycle Dummy 54558 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Alternative measures for the cost of terrorism      
Killings_prov Units 54558 0.26 1.05 0 10 
Monetary_Compensation Millions of Euros 54558 4.43 3.01 0.50 12.91 
Extortion_(Foral) Millions of Euros 53415 0.12 0.81 0.00 10.42 
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Table 2: Impact of terrorism on perceived tax enforcement (1994-2015). Interaction Foral. 
Dependent variables Perceived Tax Enforcement - PTE (Ordered Probit Models) PTE01 (Probit) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Truce 0.031 0.039 0.031 0.037 0.003 
 (0.665) (0.825) (0.656) (0.790) (0.066) 
Truce×Foral 0.156*** 0.154*** 0.193*** 0.191*** 0.173*** 
 (3.881) (3.777) (4.729) (4.592) (3.411) 
Foral -0.180*** -0.192*** -0.353*** -0.360*** -0.332*** 
 (-3.871) (-4.056) (-5.715) (-5.770) (-4.305) 
SE  0.064***  0.065*** 0.051* 
  (2.748)  (2.794) (1.890) 
Municipality Size  -0.006*  -0.007* -0.001 
  (-1.783)  (-1.946) (-0.215) 
Nationalist voter  0.006  0.001 -0.020 
  (0.142)  (0.028) (-0.401) 
Left  -0.042***  -0.042*** -0.069*** 
  (-3.951)  (-3.959) (-5.460) 
Female  -0.023**  -0.023** -0.032** 
  (-1.987)  (-1.987) (-2.269) 
Age  0.001***  0.001*** 0.002*** 
  (3.478)  (3.535) (5.344) 
Head of household  -0.012  -0.013 0.003 
  (-0.978)  (-1.027) (0.213) 
Married  0.001  0.001 0.005 
  (0.117)  (0.120) (0.346) 
Employed  0.009  0.009 0.003 
  (0.677)  (0.718) (0.211) 
Retired  -0.002  -0.002 -0.024 
  (-0.124)  (-0.107) (-1.161) 
Public Employee  -0.001  0.000 -0.015 
  (-0.059)  (0.014) (-0.931) 
Per Capita provincial GDP   -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 
   (-3.740) (-3.547) (-2.250) 
Provincial population   0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
   (4.277) (4.486) (3.668) 
Rigthist Central Government   0.198*** 0.211*** 0.251*** 
   (5.694) (6.052) (5.722) 
Country Electoral Cycle   0.176*** 0.168*** 0.146*** 
   (4.858) (4.652) (3.375) 
Leftist Regional Government   0.020 0.018 0.025 
   (1.163) (1.068) (1.171) 
Regional Electoral Cycle   -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 
   (-0.436) (-0.557) (-0.358) 
Linear Combinations      
Truce+Truce×Foral 0.187*** 0.193*** 0.223*** 0.228*** 0.176** 
 (3.18) (3.25) (3.76) (3.79) (2.54) 
Observations 47497 47382 47497 47382 47382 
Log likelihood -55099.008 -54731.406 -55082.804 -54714.936 -30490.425 
Wald chi2 (All variables) 3388.040 3851.748 3430.826 3894.658 3552.437 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2M&Z 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.12 
R2Count 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.62 
AIC 110348 109676.8 110323.6 109651.9 61198.85 
BIC 111005.6 110614.8 111016.3 110624.9 62154.34 
Note: z statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each model includes YEAR and PROVINCIAL fixed effects. Models 2, 4 and 5 also 
include a set of dummies for the political parties that respondents declared to vote for. R2M&Z is McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2; R
2
Count  is the proportion of 




Table 3: Impact of terrorism on perceived tax enforcement (1994-2015). Interaction Foral & SE 
Dependent variables Perceived Tax Enforcement - PTE (Ordered Probit Models) PTE01 (Probit) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Truce 0.031 0.038 0.031 0.037 0.003 
 (0.671) (0.818) (0.664) (0.785) (0.064) 
Truce×Foral 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.181*** 0.180*** 0.168*** 
 (3.546) (3.473) (4.397) (4.288) (3.287) 
Truce×Foral×SE 0.265* 0.258* 0.265* 0.258* 0.104 
 (1.839) (1.793) (1.832) (1.787) (0.586) 
Foral -0.176*** -0.191*** -0.350*** -0.359*** -0.331*** 
 (-3.784) (-4.023) (-5.669) (-5.750) (-4.297) 
SE 0.062*** 0.057** 0.063*** 0.058** 0.049* 
 (2.698) (2.442) (2.746) (2.488) (1.781) 
Municipality Size  -0.006*  -0.007* -0.001 
  (-1.787)  (-1.950) (-0.217) 
Nationalist voter  0.005  0.000 -0.021 
  (0.124)  (0.010) (-0.406) 
Left  -0.042***  -0.042*** -0.069*** 
  (-3.942)  (-3.950) (-5.457) 
Female  -0.023**  -0.023** -0.032** 
  (-1.982)  (-1.982) (-2.267) 
Age  0.001***  0.001*** 0.002*** 
  (3.480)  (3.537) (5.344) 
Head of household  -0.012  -0.013 0.003 
  (-0.980)  (-1.029) (0.214) 
Married  0.001  0.001 0.005 
  (0.115)  (0.117) (0.345) 
Employed  0.009  0.010 0.003 
  (0.716)  (0.758) (0.224) 
Retired  -0.002  -0.002 -0.024 
  (-0.106)  (-0.089) (-1.154) 
Public Employee  -0.001  -0.000 -0.016 
  (-0.076)  (-0.003) (-0.937) 
Per Capita provincial GDP   -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 
   (-3.768) (-3.550) (-2.252) 
Provincial population   0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
   (4.288) (4.486) (3.668) 
Rigthist Central Government   0.200*** 0.211*** 0.252*** 
   (5.754) (6.064) (5.726) 
Country Electoral Cycle   0.175*** 0.168*** 0.146*** 
   (4.830) (4.649) (3.373) 
Leftist Regional Government   0.020 0.018 0.024 
   (1.171) (1.047) (1.165) 
Regional Electoral Cycle   -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 
   (-0.446) (-0.580) (-0.364) 
Linear Combinations      
Truce+Truce×Foral 0.175*** 0.182*** 0.212*** 0.217*** 0.172** 
 (2.97) (3.05) (3.56) (3.59) (2.46) 
Truce+Truce×Foral+Truce×Foral×SE 0.441*** 0.440*** 0.477*** 0.475*** 0.276 
 (2.94) (2.93) (3.16) (3.15) (1.50) 
Observations 47497 47382 47497 47382 47382 
Log likelihood -55092.665 -54729.834 -55076.315 -54713.373 -30490.254 
Wald chi2 (All variables) 3401.181 3852.951 3443.207 3895.547 3552.711 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2M&Z 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.12 
R2Count 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.62 
AIC 110339.3 109675.7 110314.6 109650.7 61200.51 
BIC 111014.5 110622.4 111024.9 110632.5 62164.77 
Note: z statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each model includes YEAR and PROVINCIAL fixed effects. Models 2, 4 and 5 also 
include a set of dummies for the political parties that respondents declared to vote for. R2M&Z is McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2; R
2
Count  is the proportion of 





Table 4: Impact of terrorism on perceived tax enforcement (1994-2015). Alternative measures for 
terrorist activity. Interaction Foral 
Dependent variables PTE (Ordered Probit Models) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Truce 0.037    
 (0.790)    
Truce×Foral 0.191***    
 (4.592)    
Killings_province  0.011   
  (1.425)   
Killings_province×Foral  -0.041***   
  (-3.100)   
Monetary_Com   -0.017  
   (-0.731)  
Monetary_Com×Foral   -0.017**  
   (-2.573)  
Extortion_(Foral)    -0.028*** 
    (-3.225) 
Foral -0.360*** -0.222*** -0.163** -0.167** 
 (-5.770) (-3.850) (-2.489) (-2.500) 
Linear Combinations     
Truce+Truce×Foral 0.228***    
 (3.79)    
Killings_province + Killings_province×Foral  -0.029***   
  (-2.77)   
Monetary_Com + Monetary_Com×Foral   -0.034  
   (-1.42)  









Wald chi2 (All variables) 3894.658 3884.386 3882.081 3737.452 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2M&Z 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 
R2Count 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 
AIC 109651.9 109665.7 109665.9 107385 
BIC 110624.9 110638.8 110630.1 108346.9 
Note: z statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each model includes Individual Characteristics, Contextual-level characteristics, 




Table 5: Impact of terrorism on perceived tax enforcement (1994-2015). Alternative measures for 
terrorist activity. Interaction Foral & SE 
Dependent variables PTE (Ordered Probit Models) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Truce 0.037    
 (0.785)    
Truce×Foral 0.180***    
 (4.288)    
Truce×Foral×SE 0.258*    
 (1.787)    
Killings_province  0.011   
  (1.428)   
Killings_province×Foral  -0.040***   
  (-3.044)   
Killings_province×Foral×SE  -0.019   
  (-0.333)   
Monetary_Com   -0.017  
   (-0.731)  
Monetary_Com×Foral   -0.020***  
   (-2.949)  
Monetary_Com×Foral×SE   0.016*  
   (1.740)  
Extortion_(Foral)    -0.028*** 
    (-3.141) 
Extortion_(Foral)×SE    -0.026 
    (-0.933) 
Foral -0.359*** -0.222*** -0.160** -0.166** 
 (-5.750) (-3.846) (-2.436) (-2.475) 
SE 0.058** 0.066*** 0.061*** 0.067*** 
 (2.488) (2.841) (2.612) (2.831) 
Linear Combinations     
Truce+Truce×Foral 0.217***    
 (3.59)    
Truce+Truce×Foral+Truce×Foral×SE 0.475***    
 (3.15)    
Killings_province + Killings_province×Foral  -0.028***   
  (-2.70)   
Killings_province+Killings_province×Foral+Killings_province×Foral×SE -0.047   
  (-0.84)   
Monetary_Com+ Monetary_Com ×Foral   -0.037  
   (-1.55)  
Monetary_Com+ Monetary_Com×Foral+ 
Monetary_Com×Foral×SE 
  -0. 021  
   (-0.85)  
Extortion_(Foral) + Extortion_(Foral)×SE    -0.054*** 
    (-1.92) 









Wald chi2 (All variables) 3895.547 3884.729 3884.808 3738.088 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2M&Z 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 
R2Count 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 
AIC 109650.7 109667.5 109664.9 107386.4 
BIC 110632.5 110649.3 110638 108357.1 
Note: z statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each model includes Individual Characteristics, Contextual-level characteristics, 
Provincial fixed effects and Time effects. R2M&Z is McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2; R
2
Count  is the proportion of correct predictions. AIC is the Akaike's 






Framework background: The Basque Country and ETA  
The four provinces belonging to the Spanish autonomous communities of Navarre and the Basque Country 
represent the main part of the historical Basque territories: they share common cultural roots including a 
common language, “Euskera”, which in those regions is co-official with Spanish. They are two of the 
richest regions in Spain, the Basque Country being the second and Navarre the third in terms of per capita 
GDP among the Spanish autonomous communities according to the data of the Spanish National Institute 
of Statistics (INE).  From a tax management perspective, the Basque Country and Navarre enjoy a special 
(so-called “foral”) tax regime granting them an almost full autonomy in the setting and collecting of all 
the taxes which grants them  complete jurisdiction in determining tax law and tax administration. The 
foral tax authorities are appointed at the provincial level and thus the four foral provinces levy all the taxes 
that elsewhere are levied by the central government (including personal income tax and corporate tax). In 
return both autonomous communities pay an annual quota for the common public services provided by 
the central government (such as defense), which is agreed between the two parties on a periodical basis. 
An important aspect of this system is that there is no effective mechanism of equalization between the 
foral communities and the common regime communities24. In Figure A1, I highlight the foral communities 
of Navarre and the Basque Country within the Spanish national confines. 
                                                     




Figure A1: The foral autonomous communities of Navarre and the Basque Country 
 
In this context in 1959, emerged the terrorist organization ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Basque acronym 
for “Basque Homeland and Freedom”) with the political objective of achieving the establishment of an 
independent and socialist Basque state including the Spanish territories of the four foral provinces and 
three provinces in the south-west of France (Labourd, Lower Navarre and Soule).25 ETA originally 
emerged as a resistance movement to Francisco Franco’s dictatorship (1939–75) and carried out its first 
terrorist attack in 1968. Since then its violent and paramilitary activity has claimed more than 800 lives 
and many more victims in Spain until the allegedly definitive cessation of its armed activity declared on 
20 October 2011 and its definitive dissolution announced on 2 May 2018. In Figure A2, I report the 
distribution of killings due to ETA’s attacks by Spanish provinces. The picture shows that the majority of 
attacks were perpetrated in the Basque and Navarrese provinces but that also Madrid and Barcelona have 
been frequent targets. 
                                                     




Figure A2: ETA’s killings by province 
 
In particular Basque and Navarrese entrepreneurs and liberal professionals were specific targets of 
violence including blackmailing, assassinations, robberies, extortion and kidnappings-for-ransom. The 
persecution of this specific cluster of the population had an ideological dimension and led some of the 
threatened entrepreneurs to leave the Basque Country and Navarre and move their firms to more peaceful 
regions. In this regard, the extortion mechanism, described in detail in Buesa and Baumert (2013), worked 
through the sending of letters to the entrepreneurs and liberal professionals and their relatives, threatening 
that they would become targets of ETA if they did not pay. Buesa and Baumert (2013) show that the 
revolutionary tax extorted from this cluster of the population was one of the main sources of income for 
ETA from the 1970s onwards, after substituting the previously more important activities of bank robberies 
and thefts. These authors estimated that during the three decades that range from 1978 to 2008, ETA 
obtained more than 115 million euros through its extortion activity. This value has to be considered a 
minimum, since the information employed is mostly obtained from documents seized from the terrorist 
group and, as such, is incomplete. Leonisio et al. (2017) report similar results. These authors have 
estimated that ETA raised about 161 millions of euros between 1973 and 2011. According to Fernández-
Soldevilla (2016), the payment rate of the revolutionary tax was, on average, 6% in Álava, Biscay and 
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Navarre and 13% in Gipuzkoa. In the same line, Juan Miguel Liñan Macias – former representative of the 
Spanish Ministry of Defense – declared that “ETA is funded mainly from one source: the money it collects 
through extortion of small and medium-sized businessmen, charging them the so-called "revolutionary 
tax". At present the amounts required are between 35,000 and 400,000 euros. The annual budget the 
terrorist organization needs for the maintenance of its structures is estimated at around 10 million euros”.26 
Thus the effect of terrorism is responsible at least in part for the economic downturn suffered by the 
Basque Country during ETA’s period of activity (see Abadie and Gardaebazal, 2003; Enders and Sandler 
1991, 1996). 
 
Finally ETA held a central role within the Basque national liberation movement (MLNV), a composite 
aggregation of multiple organizations (both legal and illegal), which were united by the aforementioned 
common ideological objective but not always by any actual formal link. In the past decades, several 
judicial rulings have made illegal many, but not all, of the MLNV entities due to their connections with 
ETA. Some of the entities that were part of the MLNV were responsible for low-intensity urban terrorism 
(‘kale borroka’) which contributed to create an atmosphere of violence and represented a further threat to 
the stability of businesses based in the Basque Country and Navarre27.   
                                                     
26 Text extracted from: “Counterterrorism: An Example of Co-operation”, speech pronounced at the Seminar on The role of 
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in combating terrorism, Feb. 22nd, 2002. 
 
27 For a detailed investigation of ETA’s network and its financing system see Buesa (2011), Buesa and Baumert (2013), 






Here I report the results of the multilevel version of both the complete ordered probit and probit models 
(e.g. De Leeiw and Meijier, 2008; Goldstein, 2011 and Hedeker, 2008). More precisely, given that 
individuals responding to the surveys are nested within provinces and these within autonomous 
communities, I perform three-level models. Column 1 (2) of Table B1 replicates column 4 of Table 2 (3); 
column 3 (4) of Table B1 replicates column 5 of Table 2 (3).  
 
This analysis is performed to better account for within-groups correlation of the error term although in the 
main analysis I am already indirectly taking into account this issue and controlling for most of the within-
provincial correlation of the error term by including provincial level fixed effect both in equation 10 and 
11. This seems to be confirmed also by the results on the estimated variances of the random intercepts for 
provinces and regions in multilevel models presented in Table B1, which are not significantly different 
from zero. 
 
The results of the main analysis still holds for any specification of the multilevel models as the interacted 
terms and linear combinations of interacted and un-interacted coefficients show. This corroborates and 




Table B1: Impact of terrorism on perceived tax enforcement (1994-2015). Multilevel models 
Dependent variables PTE (Multilevel Ordered Probit Models) PTE01 (Multilevel Probit Models) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Truce 0.037 0.037 0.003 0.003 
 (1.222) (1.233) (0.059) (0.057) 
Truce×Foral 0.191*** 0.180*** 0.173*** 0.168*** 
 (32.558) (33.692) (4.613) (3.977) 
Truce×Foral×SE  0.258***  0.104 
  (63.857)  (0.810) 
Foral -0.360*** -0.359*** -0.332*** -0.331*** 
 (-18.475) (-19.420) (-4.310) (-4.314) 
SE 0.065*** 0.058*** 0.051** 0.049* 
 (5.185) (90.882) (1.960) (1.816) 
Municipality size -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (-16.034) (-16.227) (-0.101) (-0.101) 
Nationalist voter 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.020 -0.021 
 (136.019) (141.062) (-0.395) (-0.400) 
Left 0.211*** 0.211*** -0.069*** -0.069*** 
 (9.070) (9.414) (-3.920) (-3.917) 
Female 0.168*** 0.168*** -0.032** -0.032** 
 (4.891) (4.932) (-2.054) (-2.052) 
Age 0.018 0.018 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (1.490) (1.530) (5.156) (5.156) 
Head of household -0.008 -0.008 0.003 0.003 
 (-1.411) (-1.617) (0.204) (0.204) 
Married -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.005 0.005 
 (-2.875) (-2.913) (0.270) (0.269) 
Employed 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.003 
 (0.225) (0.064) (0.133) (0.141) 
Retired -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.024 -0.024 
 (-9.199) (-9.578) (-1.193) (-1.186) 
Public employee -0.023** -0.023** -0.015 -0.016 
 (-2.296) (-2.263) (-0.850) (-0.856) 
Per capita provincial GDP 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (25.843) (26.910) (-1.171) (-1.173) 
Provincial population -0.013* -0.013* 0.000** 0.000** 
 (-1.923) (-1.910) (2.262) (2.262) 
Rigthist central government 0.001 0.001 0.251*** 0.252*** 
 (0.521) (0.517) (3.347) (3.349) 
Country electoral cycle 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 
 (14.321) (6.173) (3.565) (3.566) 
Leftist regional government -0.002** -0.002*** 0.025 0.024 
 (-2.141) (-5.352) (0.655) (0.653) 
Regional electoral cycle 0.000 -0.000 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.041) (-0.009) (-0.265) (-0.270) 
Linear Combinations     
Truce+Truce×Foral 0.228*** 0.217*** 0.176** 0.172** 
 (9.23) (8.78) (2.14) (1.99) 
Truce+Truce×Foral+Truce×Foral×SE  0.475***  0.276*** 
  (22.97)  (2.95) 
Var(_cons[Region]) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.384) (0.423) (0.036) (0.043) 
Var(_cons[Region>Province]) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.116) (0.161) 
Observations 47382 47382 47382 47382 
Log likelihood -54714.936 -54713.373 -30490.425 -30490.254 
AIC 109433.9 109430.7 61012.85 61014.51 
BIC 109451.4 109448.3 61153.11 61163.53 
Note: z statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each model includes YEAR and PROVINCIAL fixed effects. Models 2, 4 and 5 also 
include a set of dummies for the political parties that respondents declared to vote for. AIC is the Akaike's information criterion; BIC is the Bayesian 





Placebo test: the impact of terrorism on tax enforcement effectiveness in “Capitals” 
Here I present the results of the placebo test. As suggested in Appendix A, Madrid and Barcelona have 
also been frequent targets of ETA’s attacks but I do not expect a reaction to terrorism in terms of changes 
in tax enforcement in these provinces for two reasons. First, despite they have been targeted often by ETA, 
those provinces have never been under a constant threat of terrorism so that mobility of tax bases should 
not be a threat there. Second, since these provinces are part of the common financing regime, the most 
important taxes are administered there by the central tax agency. This excludes the existence of incentives 
on the part of tax authority to counteract potential mobility of tax bases to other provinces within the same 
financing regime because this would not entail a loss of revenues (just a different territorial distribution 
of the latter). For this reason, I perform a placebo test where I introduce in equation 10 a dummy 
identifying those provinces, 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡, and an interacted term of this variable with 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡. These 
variables have been added both in presence and in absence of the term 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡. The results 
of this analysis, reported in Table C1, confirm my hypothesis: although perceived tax enforcement in 
Madrid and Barcelona is lower compared to other common regime provinces (as suggested by the 
coefficient of 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡), there is no reaction to terrorism in terms of changes in perceived tax 
enforcement for those provinces (as suggested by the coefficient of 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡). The results 
of the main analysis hold. This corroborates the main hypothesis of the paper that reaction on the part of 




Table C1: Impact of terrorism on perceived tax enforcement (1994-2015). Placebo – “Capitals” 
Dependent variables Perceived Tax Enforcement - PTE (Ordered Probit Models) 
(1) (2) 
   
Truce 0.062 0.037 
 (1.297) (0.756) 
Truce×Foral  0.191*** 
  (4.568) 
Truce×Capitals -0.013 0.002 
 (-0.498) (0.078) 
Foral -0.247*** -0.361*** 
 (-4.286) (-5.771) 
Capitals -0.667*** -0.698*** 
 (-4.254) (-4.442) 
SE 0.065*** 0.065*** 
 (2.811) (2.795) 
Municipality size -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-2.986) (-3.548) 
Nationalist voter 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (3.790) (4.007) 
Left 0.211*** 0.211*** 
 (6.043) (6.051) 
Female 0.165*** 0.168*** 
 (4.557) (4.653) 
Age 0.023 0.018 
 (1.312) (1.046) 
Head of household -0.008 -0.008 
 (-0.622) (-0.555) 
Married -0.007** -0.007* 
 (-2.018) (-1.946) 
Employed 0.016 0.001 
 (0.390) (0.027) 
Retired -0.042*** -0.042*** 
 (-3.973) (-3.959) 
Public employee -0.023** -0.023** 
 (-1.975) (-1.987) 
Per capita provincial GDP 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (3.557) (3.535) 
Provincial population -0.013 -0.013 
 (-1.026) (-1.027) 
Rigthist central government 0.001 0.001 
 (0.111) (0.120) 
Country electoral cycle 0.009 0.009 
 (0.730) (0.719) 
Leftist regional government -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.086) (-0.107) 
Regional electoral cycle -0.000 0.000 
 (-0.002) (0.015) 
Linear Combinations   
Truce+Truce×Foral  0.227*** 
  (3.77) 
Truce+Truce×Capitals 0.049 0.039 
 (0.98) (0.77) 
Observations 47382 47382 
Log likelihood -54725.209 -54714.933 
R2M&Z 0.10 0.10 
R2Count 0.46 0.46 
AIC 109672.4 109653.9 
BIC 110645.4 110635.7 
Note: z statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each model includes YEAR and PROVINCIAL fixed effects. Models 2, 4 and 5 also 
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